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The rights and privileges which a citizen of one country
may enjoy while sojourning in another, is an interesting study,
though less thought about and of much less importance than
formerly. While a stranger in ancient times was, ipso facto,
an enemy, and was treated as such, this truly barbarous rule
has so far been abrogated in modern civilized states that the
entire subject has become unimportant in most countries for
the reason that the property rights of an alien differ little if
any from the rights of a citizen.
There are some states in this country, however, where an
alien's right to acquire and hold real property is still to some
extent limited, and Pennsylvania is one of these.
The subject, therefore, is yet of interest to a Pennsylvania
lawyer, not only by reason of its historical value, but from a
practical standpoint as well. A brief reference to the historical
side of this question in leading up to the law of to-day as ex-
isting in this Commonwealth, will be not only interesting in
itself, but may be of real value in interpreting more modem
law.
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Our first inquiry naturally is:
§ I. What is an alien ?-In very ancient times every stran-
ger was an alien; and not only was he an alien, but an enemy,
until he proved himself a friend.
The modem test of an alien, i. e., place of birth, had little
weight with the roving tribes who peopled .Europe before the
crystallization of its population into nations. The inquiry
rather was as to the blood of the newcomer. If he was of
another race or even of another tribe, he was an alien.
As the organization of states became more complete, the
people who were living in certain territory and governed by
certain laws, began to think that their exclusive rights among
'themselves were derived more from those facts than from kin-
ship. The old idea of race, however, had a strong influence
upon the laws governing who should become citizens, vide the
treatment of the Jews in England, where they were kept out
of the privileges of citizenship for a great many .years, not-
withstanding the fact that generations of them-had been born
on English soil and many Hebrew names were among those
of England's most brilliant statesmen.
As far as is known, there were no very clear rules defin-
ing aliens until the thirteenth century. At that time an alien
was defined to be, one born "beyond the ligeance of the king."
Conversely, any one born in any territory, which at the time of
his birth was subject to the king's authority, was a "natural
born citizen."
The interpretation of the latter part of this law was settled
in 16o8 by Calvin's Case.' A child of Scottish parents had
been born north of the line shortly after the accession of
James VI. of Scotland to the throne of England. The question
at issue was as to his rights of citizenship in England. It was
decided that he was no alien, for the ligeance of the English
king extended over Scotland at the moment of his birth.
The circumstance that his parents are aliens will not affect the
claim to citizenship of a child born on territory subject to the
English king.
It was -doubted at one time whether a child born abroad
of English parents, would be a :citizen of Great Britain.
17 Rep. I.
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Indeed, it was formerly held that he would not be, notwith-
standing a curious decision which seems to have been rendered
as early as 129o, allowing a son born abroad to claim the
inheritance of his mother. It appeared that the wardship and
marriage of two young ladies, sisters, had been granted to one
Elyas de Rabayne. This man married one of the heiresses
and sent the other abroad to be married, in order that her
children might be aliens, thus intending to obtain the whole
of the inheritance for himself. The foreign-born son was
allowed by the court to claim his inheritance, although they
declared the decision was to be no precedent for the future.
It was made only to defeat the rascality of the guardian.
At any rate it was thought necessary to pass an act of Par-
liament providing that the children of English parents should
be citizens of great Britain, even though they happened to be
born beyond seas. An exception was made where a wife had
gone beyond seas without the consent of her husband. In
such a case the child was to be an alien.
In America the English common law rules were of course
in force until changed by statute. As Chancellor Kent points
out in his Commentaries, 2 the act of Congress passed in I8O2
was retrospective only in its provision that children of Ameri-
can parents, born beyond seas, should be deemed citizens of the
United States. For a time it seems that this question rested
for its solution solely upon the principles of common law, but
by the act of 1855, amending the act of I8O2, it is now defi-
nitely provided that all children of American citizens, although
they may be born abroad, shall be citizens of the United States,
except in cases where the fathers have never resided in this
country. 'Then the right of citizenship is not conferred upon
the children.
Some doubtful questions arose after the war of the Revolu-
tion, with regard to the status of persons who were in this
country during the war, but who had removed to England
during that time or shortly after.
By the English law any person resident in the American
colonies prior to the Revolution and subject to the colonial
125 Edw. IMI.
1Lec. XXV, p. 52.
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governments, became a citizen of the United States by the
treaty of peace of 1783, by which England recognized the
independence of the American colonies.
By our law all such persons became citizens by the Decla-
ration of Independence in 1776. In fnglis v. Sailor's Snug
Harbour,' this rule was laid down and the right of antenati in
general defined. If a man was born before July 4, 1776, left
this country before that date, took up his residence in Great
Britain and never returned, he never acquired a right of citi-
zenship in this country. If he remained here until after the
Declaration of Independence, he thereby became a citizen;
but if he was an infant at that time, he might thereafter exer-
cise a right of election, thereby deciding his allegiance.
If a man was born after the Declaration of Independence,
there was no doubt that he would be a citizen. The English
courts would decide the same, except that where our courts
reckon antenati as those born before July 4, 1776, the British
reckon from the treaty of peace in 1783.
An interesting question arose in Pennsylvania in 181o, in
the case of Jackson v. Burns.2 William Jackson died in-
testate in Pennsylvania in 1784- At the time of his death
he was the owner in fee of certain lands. His title was dis-
puted, but for the purposes of the case the court ignored that
question, as the decision went on another ground.
The dispute arose between those claiming under John Jack-
son, the elder brother and .heir-at-law of William Jackson,
and the defendants, who claimed adversely to William Jack-
son.
The single point decided by the court was as to the capa-
bility of John Jackson to inherit from his brother.
John Jackson was born in Ireland before the Revolution,
and had never been in this country. It was contended,
(i) That he had a legal claim to the land of his brother, by
virtue of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the
United States.
(z) That he had a right by the common law.
The first point the court did not discuss, because it had
13 Pet. 99.
2 3 Binn. 75.
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already been decided in the negative by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey.1
That decision being a construction of a treaty by the court
having the highest authority on such questions, was deemed
binding upon the Pennsylvania Court. But the second point
the court claimed the liberty to interpret for itself. Mr. Chief
Justice Tilghman says:
"It remains then to be considered whether by the common
law, as adopted in this State, John Jackson is an alien, incap-
able of taking land by descent.
"By the Declaration of Independence (fourth July, 1776),
all political connection between Great Britain and the United
States was dissolved. From that day the State of Pennsylva-
nia became completely sovereign and independent; and the
people of Great Britain and Pennsylvania had no other rela-
tions to each other than that of aliens; in war enemies, in
peace friends. It has never been denied that this was the case
so far as respected sovereignty and allegiance. But it has
been contended that by the principles of the common law pre-
vailing in both countries, certain rights flowing from former
connection remained in the people of each; that the right of
inheritance was unimpaired, in all those who were born
before the dismemberment of the British empire, because the
people of both countries were once bound in allegiance to the
same sovereign. Considering this subject on the principle of
reason, abstracted from authority, it would seem that the right
of taking by descent, should be governed by the condition of
the party at the time of the descent cast; because it is then
that he is to enjoy the inheritance. The denial to aliens of
the right- of taking land by descent, must have been founded
on political motives; on the danger of giving too much influ-
ence to persons, who so far from having a common interest
with the people of the country, may have an interest directly
opposed to them. Now this danger is not lessened, by the
circumstance of the people of two countries having been once
bound in bonds of common allegiance. I suspect, if the prin-
ciple contended for could be traced to its source, it would be
found to have originated in another principle, not compatible
1 4 Cr. 321.
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with the Constitution of Pennsylvania, or her sister states;
that is to say, that no man can, even for the most pressing
reasons, divest himself of the allegiance under which he was
born. ....... I am informed, however, and believe it to
be a fact, that by the law as now held in England, citizens of
the United States, born before the Revolution, are capable of
taking lands in England by descent. It is supposed by some
that merely for that reason the courts of the United States
should extend the same principle to the subjects of Great
Britain. To this I cannot assent. I confess I should be mor-
tified if my own country was surpassed by any on the globe
in acts of humanity and benevolence. But it is evident that
courts of justice have no right to regulate these matters.
They are for the sovereign power of the nation. The judges
must decide according to the law. The English adhere to
their principle, that those. who were born under the king's
allegiance can never be considered so completely aliens as to
be incapacitated from taking land by descent. But I appre-
hend that they restrict the right of inheritance to the case of
persons either born under the king's allegiance, or being under
it at the time of the descent cast. I presume they do not
extend it to all those who have owed a temporary allegiance;
for instance, to the inhabitants of a country conquered in war,
and ceded by the treaty.of peace to its former sovereign. This
principle then, even'if..ound, cannot be applied to the circum-
stances of the United States; because, although there was a
time when the people of England and the United States owed
allegiance to the same sovereign, yet there never was a time
when the people of England owed allegiance to the United
States."
This extract, from Mr. Chief Justice Tilghman's opinion,
amply explains the decision as to this point. It also refers to
the law of Great Britain, which, rather strangely, holds that all
persons born in America before the treaty of peace in 1783,
neveribecame aliens so as to lose their right to inherit.
Of course all of these questions are now at rest, but it is
curious to see into what a tangle .the courts were sometimes
led when deciding as to the devolution of real property.
It is highly probable that cases of a similar nature will arise
in the near future, apropos of our new acquisitions of territory.
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2. Right of Expatriation.-In close connection with the
preceding discussion is the question of the right of a man to
change his allegiance at will from one state to another.
This topic is important here because, if the rigfit of expa-
triation be denied, we have the strange spectacle of one man
being claimed as a subject by two different nations. It was
the denial of this right by Great Britain, and her acts in accord-
ance with her denial, that brought on the war of 1812. "Once
an Englishman, always an Englishman," is the familiar expres-
sion that embodies this idea.
This principle that a natural born British citizen was incap-
able of divesting himself of his allegiance to the Crown, was
never definitely abandoned by Great Britain until 1870, when
Parliament passed an act regulating the naturalization of aliens,
etc., and among other provisions, the following: "Any British
subject who has at any time before, or may at any time after
the passage of this act, when in any foreign state and not
under any disability, voluntarily become naturalized in such
state, shall, from and after the time of his so having become
naturalized in such foreign state, be deemed to have ceased to
be a British subject, and be regarded as an alien." The act
also makes certain provisions by which he may resume his
allegiance within a limited time, should he so desire.
It was for a long time doubtful whether an American citizen
could expatriate himself. It was thought by many that the
right is an inalienable one, naturally belonging to every man;
that it was so recognized in ancient times; and indeed this
seems to be correct. Chancellor Kent points out in his Com-
mentaries that Cicero considered it as "one of the firmest
foundations of Roman liberty," that the Roman citizen could
renounce his allegiance at pleasure. The argument continues
that since the right of expatriation was anciently recognized
to be an inalienable one, it was only denied to Englishmen by
reason of the slavish practices introduced by the Feudal Sys-
tem, by which men became chained to the soil. That when
the people emigrated to this country they left behind them all
such practices and the laws that grew out of them. Finally,
that the right of expatriation denied to Englishmen, revived
to free Americans.
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While this reasoning is theoretically satisfactory, and no
doubt would have been recognized to be sound had we not
been under the domination of the common law, yet the courts
in this country expressed themselves as very doubtful whether
the English law did not control us on that point.
The case of Talbot v. Jansen' decided in 1795 contains
one of the most interesting discussions of this question that it
has been my privilege to see. William Talbot had obtained
and fitted out an American vessel as a sloop of war. He went
to France and sold his vessel to Samuel Redick, a naturalized
French citizen, but a born American. In pursuance of his
original plan, he then took out naturalization papers for him-
self, took command of the vessel, having changed her name
from "The Fairplay" to "L'Ami de la Point-a-Petre," and, in
conjunction with another privateer of a similar character, cap-
tured a Dutch trading vessel, the Brigantine Magdalina, and
took her into Charleston harbour as a prize.
The master of the vessel, Joost Jansen, fited a libel, alleging
that his captors were citizens of the United.St?.tes, with whom
the United Netherlands were at peace, and asking for restitu-
tion.
One of the principal points at issue was the effect of Wil-
liam Talbot's emigration to France and his naturalization as a
citizen of the French Republic.
Counsel for libellee very strongly argued that William
Talbot became a French citizen by his act, and that conse-
quently the United States courts had no jurisdiction over him
or his prize. His words show the view which a large number
of people in this country held concerning this matter.
He said "The right of expatriation is antecedent and
superior to the law of society. It is implied, likewise, in the
nature and object of the social compact, which was formed to
shield the weakness and to supply the wants of individuals-to
protect the acquisitions of human industry, and to promote
the means of human happiness. Whenever these purposes
fail, either the whole society is dissolved, or the suffering indi-
viduals are permitted to withdraw from it . . . It is the
law of nature and of nature's god, pointing to 'the wide world
13 Dall, 133.
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before us, where to chuse our place of rest and Providence
our guide.1 "
He drew a distinction between allegiance and citizenship-
contending that in this country we have no such thing as
allegiance but only citizenship, which is in the control of the
individual so that he may discard it at will. "Allegiance,"
he said, was the product of the Feudal System and has no
place in a free country.
He went on to discuss the manner in which one could exercise
his right of expatriation and what acts would suffice to change
his citizenship. He conceded that one could not expatriate
himself in time of war, for this would be treason. And it would
be "reprehensible" to do so at a time when his country is
suffering from a great calamity. He concluded his argument
by declaring that a man can not serve two masters, i. e., cannot
be a citizen of two states simultaneously, and since the United
States had recognized the right of emigrants from other
countries to become citizens of this, she had impliedly recog-
nized the right of her own citizens to forswear their allegiance
to her and to join themselves to other sovereignties.
On the other hand it was admitted that a citizen of the
United States has a right to emigrate to other countries when
he pleases, provided it is done bona fide, with good cause, and
under the regulation of the laws; but it was insisted that in
the present case the act was not done bona fide, but was' con-
trary to law from the first, and, consequently, William Talbot
never lost his character as an American citizen, even if he
had acquired a citizenship in France.
The majority of the court delivered no opinion upon this
particular point, but Mr. Justice Iredell in delivering his con-
curring opinion deals carefully with it.
He says: "The first point to be considered is,--
"Whether Talbot, at the time of his receiving the com-
mission, and at the time of the capture, was a French citizen.
"This involves the great question as to the right of expa-
triation, upon which so much has been said in this cause.
Perhaps, it is not necessary it should be explicitly decided on
this occasion; but I shall freely express my sentiments on the
subject.
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"That a man ought not to be a slave; that he should not
be confined against his will to a particular spot, because he
happened to draw his first breath upon it; that he should not
be compelled to continue in a society to which he is acci-
dentally attached, when he can better his situation elsewhere,
much less when he must starve in one country, and may live
comfortably in another; are positions which I hold as strongly
as any man, and they are such as most nations in the world
appear clearly to recognize.
"The only difference of opinion is, as to the proper manner
of executing this right. Some hold, that it is a natural,
unalienable right in each individual; that it is a right upon
which no act of legislation can lawfully be exercised, inas-
much as a legislature might impose dangerous r stiaints upon
it; and of course, it must be left to every man's will and
pleasure, to go off, when and in what manner he pleases.
"This opinion is deserving of more deference, because it
appears to have the sanction of the Constitution of this State,
if not of some other states in the Union. I must, however,
presume to differ from it, for the following reasons:
The reasons- which the learned Justice gave are substan-
tially two.
(I) Because the citizen owes certain duties to society;
which has a right to claim him until these duties be fulfilled-
therefore, the right ot expatriation cannot be a natural right,
for if it were so, society would have no claim at all upon the
individual.
(2) If it be a natural, inalienable right, it should be exer-
cised in time of war as well as in time of peace-yet all writers
agree it cannot be exercised in time of war.
In this case the conduct of William Talbot plainly showed
that hi§ act was not bona fide, with intent to forever become
a French citizen, consequently, on any ground, he had not
in this case exempted himself from his responsibility as an
American citizen.
It will be observed that this point was not considered
necessary to the decision and the court as a whole shrank
from deciding it.
The same question was treated in much the same nanner
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in the case of the Tinidad and the St. Ander,' decided in
18z2. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: "Assuming, for the
purpose of argument, that an American citizen may, independ-
ently of any legislative act to this effect, throw off his own
allegiance to his native country, as to which we give no
opinion, it is perfectly clear, that this cannot be done without
a bona fide change of domicile under circumstances of good
faith. It can never be asserted as a cover for fraud, or as a
justification for the commission of a crime against the country,
or for violation of its laws, when this appears to be the
intention of the act. It is unnecessary to go into a further
examination of this doctrine; and it will be sufficient to ascer-
tain its precise nature and limits, when it shall become the
leading point of a judgment of the court."
While no definite legislative act has ever been passed upon
this question, the doubt indicated by the language of these
decisions, to be in the minds of the court, was obviated by a
declaratory act passed by Congress in 1868, declaring that
"Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent
right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and
whereas, in the recognition of this principle, this government
has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested
them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed
that such American citizens, with their descendants, are sub-
jects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the government
thereof; and whereas it is necessary to public peace that this
claim of perpetual allegiance should be promptly and finally
disavowed, therefore, be it enacted, that any declaration,
instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this
government, which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the
right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of this government."
This act seems to have been accepted as an interpretation of
the common law, and the right is now recognized to be a
natural one.
Many puzzling questions often arise in connection with the
change of citizenship from one country to another.
1 7 Wheat 283.
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When does the protection of the old government cease?
When does the new attach ? Is naturalization necessary, etc.,
etc. ? Sometimes, also, a citizen of one country may leave
under such circumstances that he owes a duty to his govern-
ment. If he subsequently comes within the jurisdiction of
that country, can he claim the protection of his new sovereign
against the old? All these are questions that are arising
occasionally at this day. Some of them have been decided,
while others are still in doubt.
It is generally conceded that two things are necessary to
release an individual absolutely from his allegiance to his native
State.
(I) A bonafide change of domicile.
We have seen what is meant by this in the case of Talbot v.
Jansen; and,
(2) Naturalization according to the laws of the country of
his adoption.
When these two elements concur, then, by both English and
American law, the citizen has become gaa alien.
While the subsidiary questions that arise in this connection
are not, perhaps, directly in line with the* subject of this paper,
which is intended to deal more with the rights of aliens, yet it
may not be uninteresting to notice one or two of the leading
cases that have arisen.
Two of these questions will be briefly referred to here.
(I) Supposing a man has become expatriated, by change of
domicile and by naturalization, has he so completely severed
his connection with the mother country that it no longer has
any claim on him at all?
(2) May a citizen, under any circumstances, become ex-
patriated without naturalization under a foreign State?
The first of these questions has given rise to the exchange
of many diplomatic notes between this country and European
countries, particularly Germany. Suppose a German emigrates
to this country while under age, and becomes. naturalized.
He then returns to the Fatherland. Can he be held for mili-
tary duty ?
This precise state of facts arose in the case of Johann
Knocke, a native of Prussia, who, after naturalization in- this
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country, returned to his native land. He was held by the
Prussian Government for military service, and in his extremity
went to Mr. Wheaton, then American Minister at Berlin, for
advice. Mr. Wheaton advised him that he would be protected
as long as he was in any other country. but Prussia; "but
having returned to the country of your birth, your native domi-
cile and national character revert (so long as you remain in
Prussian dominions), and you are bound to obey the laws as
if you had never emigrated."
This unqualified statement strikes us as being a little start-
ling and quite similar to the old English view. Very shortly
after this incident the opposite view was expressed by the
American diplomats; i. e., that "the moment a foreigner
becomes naturalized his allegiance to his native country is
severed forever."
A middle ground has finally been settled upon, which is
substantially that when a foreigner leaves some duty owing to
his native country on his departure, he may, on his return, be
held for that duty, but not for any other accruing after he had
changed his domicile.
The case of Simon Toussig illustrates this point. He vio-
lated the laws of Austria while a native resident, and then to
escape punishment went to the United States. After having
declared his intention of becoming naturalized, he returned to
Austria. He was arrested for his previous offences. The
American consul refused to interfere, as the offences had been
committed before Toussig had ever gone to America.
In such cases the jurisdiction of the home government does
not attach until the emigrant has actually returned to its ter-
ritory. Martin Kozta, a Hungarian refugee, after having in
America declared his intention of becoming naturalized, went
to Smyrna under the protection of a United States traveling
pass. While there he was seized by some agents of the
Austrian government, taken out in a boat and thrown into
the sea. He was eventually picked up by an Austrian ship-
of-war, "The Hussar." Austria refused to give Kozta up
until the American ship-of-war, "The St. Louis," was sent
to enforce the demand. for his release. The American
consul held that even allowing Austria's right to proceed
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against the refugee upon his return to Austria, yet he was under
the protection of the American flag, as long as he was on
American or neutral soil, or on the high seas.
(2) As to the second subsidiary question in regard to
whether a man may ever become expatriated without natural-
ization, only a word need be said.
It is generally recognized that there may be circumstances
such that a man loses all claim to the protection of the United
States even though he may be a natural born citizen and has
never been naturalized in a foreign state.
To illustrate the point it will be sufficient to refer to the
case of Francois A. Heinrich, who was born in New York.
His parents were unnaturalized Austrians. When Francois
was only three years old they returned to Austria, taking him
with them, and neither child nor parents ever returned to this
country. When he became of age Francois was conscripted
into the Austrian army. He claimed exemption" as'an Ameri-
can citizen. The American consul refused td" ifiterfere for
him, on the ground that he had completely exipatriated him-
self. I venture to suggest that under the same circumstances
a British citizen would have been protected by the Crown, but
that, of course, is mere conjecture. This precedent seems to
be an established one in the United States.
§ 3. Rights of citizens domiciled abrad.-A citizen of any
country, who is temporarily residing abroad, is entitled to the
protection of his home government in case his rights are inter-
fered with.
If, however, he is residing permanently in a foreign country,
the question arises, how far is he still to be deemed under the
protection of his native flag and to what extent will his gov-
ernment interfere for him?
The British Foreign Office seems to hold that a permanent
residence abroad in no wise detracts from the right of the
citizen to the protection of the British Crown, and that that
"protection" will be carried to the extent of interfering with
the internal affairs of the country. wherein her citizens are
residents.
In America we have not yet carried our ideas of "protec-
tion" so far. The case of Murray v. The Schooner Charming
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Betsey' arose out of an alleged violation of the Non-Intercourse
Act of I8oo, prohibiting American vessels from trading with
France. It appeared that this schooner sailed from Baltimore,
Md., to the island of St. Bartholomew's, where her cargo was
disposed of, and thence to St. Thomas', where the vessel was
sold to one Jared Shattuck, a native of Connecticut, but who
had resided since his early youth in St. Thomas (a Danish
dependency). He had married a wife, acquired property
(some of which was only proper to be acquired by a Danish
burgher), and had in every way manifested his desire to become
a bona fide Danish subject, except that he had not becoIe
naturalized.
The schooner having been reladen, was bound for Guada-
loupe when she was captured by a French privateer. A few
days later she was captured by the United States ship " Con-
stellation" and taken to the island of Martinique. From
there the "Charming Betsey" was sent to the United States
for adjudication.
One of the main points at issue was as to the status of Jared
Shattuck-and particularly whether he was comprehended in
the terms of the Non-Intercourse Act.
On this point, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: "Whether
a person born within the United States, or becoming a citizen
according to the established laws of the country, can divest
himself absolutely of that character otherwise than in such
manner as may be prescribed by law, is a question which it is
not necessary at present to decide. The cases cited at bar,
and the arguments drawn from the general conduct of the
United States on this interesting subject, seem completely to
establish the principle that an American citizen may acquire,
in a foreign country, the commercial privileges attached to his
domicile, and be exempted from the operation of an act ex-
pressed in such general terms as that now under considera-
tion.
"Indeed, the very expressions of the Act would seem to
exclude a person under the circumstances of Jared Shattuck.
He is not a person under the protection of the United States.
The American citizen who goes into a foreign country,
12 Cr. 6i.
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although he owes local and temporary allegiance to that
country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing his con-
dition, entitled to the protection of his own government; and
if, without the violation of any municipal law, he should be
oppressed unjustly, he would have a right to claim that pro-
tection; and the interposition of the American Government in
his favor would be considered as a justifiable interposition.
But his situation is completely changed where by his own act
he has made himself the subject of a foreign power. Although
this act may not be sufficient to rescue him from punishment
for any crime committed against the United States, a point not
intended to be decided, yet it certainly places him out of the
protection of the United States, while within the territory of
the sovereign to whom he has sworn allegiance and, conse-
quently, takes him out of the description of the Act.
" It is, therefore, the opinion of the court that the ' Charm-
ing Betsey,' with her cargo, being at the time of fher recapture
the bonafide property of a Danish burgher, is not forfeitable,
in consequence of her being employed in carrying on trade
and commerce with a French island."
This language would indicate that the United States is not
prone to follow and protect a citizen who has voluntarily
acquired a permanent domicile elsewhere.
A paragraph from an editor's note in Wheaton's Inter-
national Law well sums up this subject:' "fIn 1873, Mr. Fish
issued instructions to the American Ministef in France, in
which, after quoting the above dictum of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, he thus explains the principles upon which the American
Government now acts in protecting its subjects abroad. 'If
on the one hand the Government assumes the duty of pro-
tecting his rights and privileges, on the other hand the citizen
is supposed to be ever ready to placd his fortune and even his
life at its service, should the public necessities demand such a
sacrifice. If, instead of doing this, he permanently withdraws
his'person from the national jurisdiction; if:he places his
property where it cannot be made to contribute to the national
necessities; if his children are born and reared upon a foreign
soil, with no purpose of returning to submit to the jurisdiction
I Boy's Edition, 151 n.
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of the United States, then, in accordance with the principles
laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, and recognized in the
Fourteenth Amendment, and in the Act of 1868, he has so
far expatriated himself as to relieve this Government from the
obligation of interference for his protection.
"' Each case as it arises must be decided on its own merits.
In each the main fact to be determined will be this,--has
there been such a practical expatriation as removes the indi-
vidual from the jurisdiction of the United States ?
"' If there has not been, the applicant will be entitled to
protection.'"
If the citizen is only temporarily abroad, it is understood
that he must obey the laws of the country he is in, or else he
is liable to the punishment usually inflicted by the law of that
country.
§ 4. Rights of Aliens in England and the United States.
(a) In General.-It might seem more appropriate to discuss
this subject under the head of" The Disability of Aliens," but I
speak of the rights of aliens advisedly, because, strictly speak-
ing, at common law an alien had no rights at all, hence a dis-
cussion of this subject more properly is an epitome of the
privileges which have, from time to time, been conferred
upon him.
As I have just indicated, originally, at common law, an
alien had no civil rights whatever. This idea was the lineal
descendant of the theory that all strangers are enemies.
Though this stranger was without rights, he was not free
from liabilities, as he was obliged to conform to the English
law. He was considered to have enough privilege if he were
graciously permitted to exist within the boundaries of his
Majesty's dominions. His taxes were even higher than the
taxes of citizens.
Even foreign merchants had no legal rights until the pass-
age of _agna Charta in 215. By that great Act some few
privileges were granted to them. Then came 16 Henry III.,
followed by the Carta Mercatoria, 31 Edw. I., which granted
the first real concessions to this class of men who had done
so much to make England great. Even merchants, however,
were not allowed to own real property.
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Probably by reason of the exceptions in favor of merchants,
the rule was established that an alien could recover personal
property in the courts. In the reign of Henry VI., a case
seems to have carried this exception to the point of allowing
an alien merchant to lease a house for the purposes of trade.
But by Act of Parliament, 32 Hen. VIII., it was forbidden to
any alien to hire or lease a house.
The law remained substantially in this condition until very
recently in England-i. e., that aliens could acquire and hold
personal property-but not real. That is, they could not
acquire real property at all by operation of law, and if they
did by purchase, they held. only de facto, liable to be dis-
possessed by the Crown by "office found" at any time, the
Crown being considered to have an inherent right to expel all
aliens and confiscate their property.
Why the distinction was made between personal and real
property, has been the subject of some controversy. Black-
stone assigns two reasons why no alien can acq,ire land by
operation of law.
(I) That if this were allowed, since the owner, of land owed
allegiance to the king, this allegiance would be inconsistent
with that which he owed to his own sovereign; and
(2) That such practices would subject the government to
pernicious foreign influence.
As to the right of the Crown to confiscate land purchased
by aliens, he says that this probably was to punish their pre-
sumption for attempting to acquire landed property-not a
very valid reason it would seem to us.
It is suggested in Pollock and Maitland's " History of
English Law "' that the true explanation is that the king's
claim to seize all the land of aliens was a generalization from
his right to seize the land of his French enemies. However
that may have been there is no doubt that this right was often
made use of as well as the right to expel, which latter was
exercised for the last time in 1575, when all aliens were driven
out. These rights of confiscation and expulsion have for
many years been practically obsolete.
At the present time an alien in England may acquire, either
1 P. 445.
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by purchase or inheritance, and hold real and personal prop-
erty in all respects the same as a native born citizen. These
rights were conferred by the Act of Parliament of 1870,
usually referred to as the "Naturalization Act." This act in
the most complete manner, as far as regards property rights,
obliterates the disability of alienage.
The laws of the United States are not yet so liberal towards
aliens as the laws of England. The law relating to the hold-
ing of real property in the territories is fixed by act of Con-
gress. By the act of 1887 it is made "unlawful for any
person or persons not citizens of the United States, or who
have not lawfully declared their intention to become such
citizens, or for any corporation not created by or under the
laws of the United States, or of some state or territory of
the United States, to hereafter acquire, hold, or own real
estate so hereafter acquired, or any interest therein, in any
of the territories of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, except such as may be acquired by inheritance or
in good faith in the ordinary course of justice in the collection
of debts heretofore created: Provided, that the prohibition of
this section shall not apply to cases in which the right to hold
or dispose of lands in the United States is secured by existing
treaties to the citizens or subjects of foreign countries, which
rights, so far as they may exist by force of any such treaty
shall continue to exist so long as such treaties are in force,
and no longer."
With respect to the right of aliens to hold property in the
states the law is very much diversified, by reason of the fact
that the regulation of the matter has been left to the states
themselveS. Presumptively, as the common law is applicable
to all the states until altered by legislation, an alien cannot in
any state take real property by operation of law, nor purchase
an indefeasible title, unless this right has been given by
legislation.
As to personal property, a general statement may be made
that aliens may acquire and hold personal property, as if they
were citizens, anywhere in the United States. Even in the
absence of statutory provisions, it seems that they would be
entitled to do so by the common law.
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The law as to real property must be ascertained by a refer-
ence to the statute law of the various states. In the great
majority of them the English rule has been adopted, often in
language very similar to the English act, thus absolutely
removing the disability of alienage. It is not the intention to
examine the various state laws in this article, but to the gen-
eral observation above, it may be added that in Oregon and
California the Chinese are discriminated against; in.others
alien residents only can hold land, while in a few a declaration
of an intention to become a citizen is a necessity.'
(b) Pennsylvania Statute Law.-At the time of the separa-
tion of the colonies from Great Britain, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania owned a large tract of unimproved land. It was
obviously to her interest to sell as much of this land as pos-
sible, to serve the double purpose of benefiting her financially
and of improving the country. For this reason the policy of the
government was, for several years immediately following 1776,
shaped to the purpose of disposing of as much of this waste
territory as possible, and not only to citizens.but to foreigners.
Hence we find early laws passed by the General Assembly
more favorable to aliens than later ones. : ..
The first act upon the subject was passed in 1778.2 It con-
firmed the titles of persons who had, as heirs, devisees or
assignees, derived title to land from aliens who had settled in
Pennsylvania, although they had never been naturalized. It
did not in any way enlarge the rights of aliens themselves to
acquire or hold land.
The next year an act was passed which, for the period
extending from the date of the act, February Ir, 1789, until
the first of January, 1792, authorized alien friends to purchase
and hold lands the same as though they were citizens. This
act was kept in force by various renewing acts until 1797,
when the unimproved lands having been mostly disposed of
by the Commonwealth, and the same urgent need for money
not existing, it was suffered to expire. No act has since been
passed in this state granting such wide privileges of purchase
to aliens.
'See Stimson's American Statute Law, 6o12 et seq.
sI Sm. L. 461.
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About the same time, 179I,1 an act was passed which held
out still further inducements to foreigners to settle and acquire
land in this Commonwealth. It provided that no person
should be incapable of taking land by inheritance or by devise
by virtue of being an alien, thus guaranteeing to prospective
purchasers the security of being able to leave their property
to their .families, even though the latter were still in the old
country.
To briefly summarize the rights of aliens to hold real prop-
erty in this Commonwealth I will divide the subject into three
topics :
I. CAPACITY OF ALIENS TO ACQUIRE AND TRANSMIT REAL
PROPERTY BY DEVISE OR DESCENT.
As we have just seen, an alien may acquire property by
devise or by descent as if he were a citizen, he is under no
disability at all. This right must be distinguished from
the capacity of an alien to leave property to his heirs or
devisees. The act removes the disability to take; it does not
affect the disability of an alien ancestor to transmit his prop-
erty to his descendants or to his devisees. The fear of Black-
stone's time, that the country would be subjected to pernicious
foreign influence, or that the alien heir would be bound in
allegiance to two sovereigns, seems to have lost its influence
over the minds of legislators.
In Rubeck v. Gardner2 it appeared that John Lawyer, an
alien, had purchased lands in Pennsylvania and died.
The contest arose between his heirs and his widow, in
whom the Legislature bad vested the title, presuming it to
have escheated to the Commonwealth. Mr. Justice Sergeant,
in delivering the opinion of the court says: "The main ques-
tion raised by the plaintiff in error is, on the due construction
of the act of twenty-third February, 1791; did that act, as
the plaintiff in error contends, authorize a citizen or subject of
a foreign state to take lands in Pennsylvania by devise or
descent, from an alien who had purchased them without
having complied with the conditions imposed by the law?
3 Sm. L. 4.
27 Watts, 455.
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It seems to me that this construction would be contrary to
the letter of the act and its whole object and design. The act
was passed, as the preamble recites, for the encouragement of
persons purchasing lands in this State; and therefore must
naturally refer to persons purchasing lawfully, and not
to persons acquiring lands here contrary to law. It enables
every person, being the citizen or subject of any foreign
state, to acquire and take, by devise or descent, lands
and other real property in this Commonwealth. A title
by devise or descent is a derivative title; it can rise no
higher than its source. The devisee or heir can only take
what the ancestor had. But if the ancestor was an alien, and
as such incompetent to take, and on his death his property
escheated, there was nothing to descend or pass by will. If
this act were to receive the construction contended for by the
plaintif, the heir or devisee of an alien would enjoy a greater
and more entire estate than the alien himself had: whereas, it
would seem to be the object of the act to enable a party-.to
transmit an estate legally purchased.''
The right to devise property acquired by purchase;6r to
-leave it to their heirs under the intestate laws, has since'been
conferred upon aliens to a limited extent.
By the Act of February 1o, 1807,1 it was provided in addi-
tion to the power of purchase, that aliens who had declared
their intention of becoming citizens, could hold real property
in fee simple. This necessarily carried with it the right to
leave it to their heirs.
The amount to be so held was limited by the following
clause: "No alien or aliens shall be competent to purchase
and hold more than five hundred acres until after he or they
shall have actually become a citizen or citizens of the United
States."
It might be suggested that no alien could hold inore than five
hundred acres even after he had become a citizen, inasmuch as
he would no longer be an alien, but the meaning of the clause
is clear enough.
In 1818 we have an act which again enlarges the power of
aliens to transmit real property acquired by purchase to their
14 Sm. T4. 362.
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heirs. The act of March 241 gave all alien friends, whether
they had declared their intention to become citizens or not,
the right to hold a limited amount of real property "to their
heirs and assigns forever, as fully, to all intents and purposes,
as any natural born citizen may or can do." The amount of
property allowed to be so purchased and held under the pro-
visions of this act was limited to five thousand acres.
By the Act of May i, 1861,' aliens may hold real estate to
the amount of five thousand acres and of a value not exceed-
ing twenty thousand dollars in net annual income. This act
says nothing specifically about the quantum of estate to be so
held, but as it does not repeal the act of 1818, and is con-
sistent with it, there is no doubt that the same provisions as
to that point would apply.
In the case of Commonwealtk v. Detwiler,3 Mr. Justice
Williams said: "Even as to real estate, the distinction be-
tween a resident alien friend and a citizen has disappeared in
Pennsylvania and nearly every other State in the Union."
Yet we must remember that the power of an alien to hold
land acquired by purchase is limited to five thousand acres in
amount and twenty thousand dollars in annual value.
As to the capacity of an alien devisee or heir to leave the
property so acquired to his heirs or devisees, there is no
question. As he can thus acquire a fee simple, he can of course
leave the same to his heirs. But if he purchases beyond the
limit the excess would escheat to the commonwealth.
2. CAPACITY OF ALIENS To AcQUIRE REAL PROPERTY BY
PURCHASE.
This topic has already been touched upon. The act of
February io, 18o74, was the first permanent act to be passed
granting powers of purchase to aliens. As indicated above,
this act limited the power it conferred to aliens who had
declared their intention of becoming citizens, and the amount
of land to five hundred acres.
17 Sm. L. i33.
2 p. L. 433.
3131 Pa. 6r4.4Supra.
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Then in 1814 an act was passed permitting alien enemies
who had declared an intention to become citizens, to "receive
and hold" land, not exceeding two hundred acres in amount
nor twenty thousand dollars in value.
In 18182 the limitations of the act of i8o7 were loosened.
The alien need not have declared his intention to become a
citizen, and might purchase to the amount of five thousand
acres.
The Act of I86I0 limited the value to a net annual income
of twenty thousand dollars.
The word "purchase," as appearing in our acts, is strictly
construed, and does not include the acquisition of title by
curtesy.4 It is construed to mean purchase in the popular
and not in the legal sense. Consequently there are still sev-
eral means of acquiring title yet wholly denied to the alien.
This is the condition of the law in this State to-day.
For all practical purposes the alien friend is on the same
footing as a citizen, but nevertheless there are limits to his
purchasing power.
When Bonaparte, ex-King of Spain, came to this country
to settle, he desired to purchase a large landed property,
and was compelled to go over the river into New Jersey,
when he would have preferred to acquire property in Pennsyl-
vania. Our laws were not liberal enough for him. So we see
that our restrictions have been of practical service in the past
and may be in the future.
A great many acts confirmatory of previously acquired
titles have been passed, but as they do not affect the capacity
of an alien I shall not here refer to themt
3. RIGHT OF AN ALIEN TO DEAL IN PERSONAL PROPERTY.
As I have before indicated there are no restrictions upon
the right of an alien in this country to purchase, hold and
dispose of personal property as he sees fit.
'March 22, 6 Sm. L. 178.
Act of March 24, supra.
3 May i, supra.
'Reese v. Waters, 4 W. & S. x45.
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In Commonwealth v. Detwiler' Mr. Justice Williams says:
"We think the right of all persons, not alien enemies, to
buy and hold, use and enjoy, personal property, whether cor-
porate stocks or articles of merchandise, is older than the
Constitution, and that citizenship of the United States is not
necessary to its exercise. . . . In Pennsylvania. therefore,
a resident alien friend can deal as freely in all forms of prop-
erty, whether personal or real, 'to all intents and purposes as
any natural born citizen or citizens may or can do.' He may
embark in business, become a stockholder in a joint-stock
association or corporation, become a manager or director,
when not expressly made ineligible, and use, enjoy, control
and direct his property, of whatever nature or kind, in the
same manner as any natural-born citizen may do."
Thomas Raeburn White.
1Supra.
